Both Israel and Iran are wooing Saudi Arabia. Which side will Mohammad bin Salman pick in an Iran–Israel conflict? As Israel mulls a response to Iran’s 200-missile barrage on 1 October, the Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia are keen to project their neutrality.
West Asia, or the Middle East as some call it, is on tenterhooks.
Will Israel retaliate against Iran’s retaliation against Israel’s …?
You get the drift.
Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defence minister, doesn’t say when but he has told his troops that it will be lethal, precise, and, above all, surprising. His words, not mine.
So, Israel could, for instance, attack Iran’s oil facilities or nuclear installations, carry out targeted assassinations, damage Iran’s interests in third countries (like it is already doing in Lebanon and Syria) or effect a regime change in Tehran: Oust the Mullahs and overthrow the Government that has been in place since the 1979 Revolution. It’s all in the realm of possibility.
Already, the son of the former King of Iran has spoken out against the Government led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. Reza Pahlavi is the son of the late King, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ruled Iran till the 1970s. He advocates a return to monarchy, though.
So, Israel may hit Iran where it hurts. Let’s assume for a moment that it will. The questions you and I should be asking are the following:
— What will Saudi Arabia do?
— Which way will Mohammad bin Salman go?
— Which side will Arabs take in an Iran – Israel war?
— Will the Saudi Arabia – Iran detente hold?
— And will a Saudi Arabia – Israel peace accord come through?
Mohammad bin Salman or M.B.S., as he is known by his initials, is the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia. He is the de facto ruler of the Kingdom; the heir apparent to the Saudi throne; the seventh son of King Salman and a grandson of the Kingdom’s founder, King Abdul Aziz. Both Israel and Iran are wooing the Saudis. Mohammad bin Salman was about to “normalise” its relations with Israel until the Gaza conflict erupted last October.
The 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks in Israel stopped Saudi Arabia in its tracks. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has already normalised its ties with Iran. In March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore their diplomatic relations after a gap of seven years.
Saudi Arabia is not alone. More wealthy Gulf countries such as the U.A.E. and Qatar are shoring up ties with Iran and giving assurances they will not help Israel attack Iran. Most of these countries have traditionally been allies of the West. But, these resource-rich Monarchies have grown closer to Iran after a long period of tension with their giant neighbour across the Gulf. As Israel prepares a response to Iran’s 200-missile barrage on 1 October, the Gulf is keen to project its neutrality in the conflict.
The Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia have pledged not to let Israel use their airspace for attacks on Iran. It follows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Doha where he met Qatar’s Emir and Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister. Iran also dispatched its Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Neil Quilliam from the London-based think-tank Chatham House says that Iran used the visits to send a message that Israel risks harming relations with the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia and others, if it starts a wider conflict. That is not all. More importantly, the message being sent out is that while Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia are warming, the prospect of Israel normalising its ties with Saudi Arabia is diminishing.
So, what explains Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to overtly co-operate with Israel? The reasons are not far to seek. Oil-rich Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have both been attacked and threatened by Iran-backed groups in the past, including the Houthis of Yemen who temporarily halved Saudi crude-oil production in 2019. The attack on Saudi Arabia’s Aramco oilfield shut down over five per cent of global oil supply. Similarly, in 2022, the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen fired missiles and drones at oil-refuelling trucks near an oil refinery owned by the U.A.E.’s state oil firm ADNOC.
A repeat of that would cause regional oil-supply disruptions, which, in turn, could have global ramifications, including a surge in oil prices. Torbjorn Soltvedt of the U.K.-headquartered risk-intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft says that the main concern for the Gulf countries would be that an Iranian retaliation could extend to attacks against their own energy infrastructure. During their recent meetings, Iran warned Saudi Arabia that it could not guarantee the safety of the Kingdom’s oil facilities if Israel were given any assistance in carrying out an attack.
Clearly, Saudi Arabia and its allies in the six-nation Gulf Co-operation Council have to do a difficult balancing act. The G.C.C. comprises Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. Iran has of late re-established ties with all G.C.C. countries except Bahrain, which has recently expressed an interest in to resume the ties. Today, all six G.C.C. members are engaged in direct and multilateral discussions with Tehran.
The G.C.C. foreign ministers held an informal meeting with their Iranian counterpart in Doha on 3 October – the first meeting of its kind. Anna Jacobs of a Brussels-based think-tank called International Crisis Group says that the “Gulf states are trying to leverage improved relations with Iran to avoid being caught in the middle of an Israel – Iran escalation.”
Although Iran’s missile attack on Israel drew condemnation from the West, the Arab Gulf states refrained from commenting on it. As Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al-Busaidi says, “It is easy for certain governments to stand by and condemn Iranian actions. But that solves nothing. Nor does the familiar policy of defending Israel come what may”.
The Omani minister goes on to say in a rather long post on X that a fully sovereign Palestinian state must be established. Now, that is a sentiment that is shared by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, too. Saudi Arabia paused U.S.-brokered talks on recognising Israel after the Gaza war broke out. Saudi officials say that Riyadh wants a pathway towards a Palestinian state as a condition of normalization.
So, in all likelihood, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Qatar have indicated that they will not NOT allow Israeli issiles to pass through. What about Jordan, you might ask? Jordan has not revealed its mind about which way it will go. When Iran attacked Israel in April, Jordan did shoot down some projectiles over its airspace. So, Israel could still route its strikes through Jordan. But, Israel has other options, too, including mid-air refuelling capabilities that would enable its jets to fly down the Red Sea, into the Indian Ocean, proceed to the Gulf and then fly back.
While the jury is out on the wisdom and efficacy of an Israeli strike on Iran, U.S. President Joe Biden and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a 30-minute phone call on 9 October. They spoke about Israel’s desire to hit back at Iiran. The U.S. believes that Iran is not about to make a nuclear weapon.
But, and this is an important but, an attack could push them to build one! Iran might also choose to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And if that happens, certain countries in the region would be tempted to expand their nuclear programmes, raising fears of a regional nuclear proliferation. Reports say that the U.S. has specifically asked Israel not to target Iran’s nuclear and energy facilities. But Netanyahu refuses to share his plan. For his part, Iran’s Foreign Mister Abbas Araghchi quotes Newton’s third law of motion to say that for every action, there is a reaction. He says that Iran will give a stronger and more forceful response to any Israeli action.
This tit-for-tat cycle of violence is never-ending. So, expect Iran to retaliate against Israel’s retaliation to Iran’s …
You get the drift.
By: Ramesh Ramachandran (DD India)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Ramesh Ramachandran is a Senior Consulting Editor and presenter with D.D. India. He can be reached at @RRRameshRRR on X.